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In the rapidly changing environment both within the European 
Union (EU) and outside its border, several factors have proven 
to be major challenges to the EU’s external action. Among oth-
ers, these include the rise of populism in EU Member States, 
the ongoing migration/refugee crisis, instability near the EU’s 
borders, Russia’s geopolitical activism and revisionist policy, 
Turkey’s aspiration to become a regional power autonomous 
from Western institutions, the foreign policy implications of 
the ongoing Brexit negotiations, and a decline in transatlantic 
cooperation. With these facts in mind, it is fair to ask what 
the EU’s response should be to a world that has fundamentally 
changed and is continuously being transformed. 
On 28 June 2016, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini present-
ed the “The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy” (EUGS) to the European Council. The 
EUGS’ main objective is to articulate and sustain a coherent 
vision for the external action of the EU. As such, it sheds some 
light on the matter of the EU’s strategy in world affairs, its ef-
fectiveness, the variables affecting it, and Europe’s reaction to 
them, particularly as regards the emergence of a “strategic au-
tonomy” as the means to pursue Europe’s goals. 
This chapter attempts to provide an assessment of the first 
three years of the EUGS by examining the EU’s relations with 
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its major partners. We discuss the concept of strategic auton-
omy and how the EU’s relations with its partners contribute 
to this debate. In doing so, we first provide a brief overview of 
the EUGS and discuss what “strategic autonomy” entails. We 
then examine the relationship between the EU and the United 
States (US) in the context of NATO. We continue our analysis 
with EU-Russian relations, current EU-Turkish relationship, 
EU-China cooperation and the outlook of the Western Balkans 
in joining the EU. We conclude by examining Italy’s foreign 
policy agenda towards the EU security and defence policy and 
the development of a European strategic autonomy.  
The EU’s Global Strategy: A Brief Overview 
The EUGS is a brave attempt to assemble and analyse numer-
ous dimensions of the EU’s external action in one document1. 
This exercise is not an easy task, but it is a very ambitious one. 
Conceivably, the key feature of this document is that “for the 
first time ever an EU document lists our vital interests (which 
is a breakthrough in its own right)”2. It comprises four main 
building blocks that are closely interrelated: a) a global strategy 
to promote EU’s citizens’ interests, b) the principles guiding 
the EU’s external action, c) the priorities of the EU’s external 
action and d) strategies to transform  “words” (i.e. the vision) 
into “deeds” (i.e. the action). 
Anyone reading the EUGS could draw a number of conclu-
sions3. In her foreword, HR Federica Mogherini strikes a tone 
that highlights the complexity of the document and the 
1 H. Dijkstra, “Introduction: One-and-a-half  Cheers for the EU Global Strategy”, 
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 369-373.  
2 S. Biscop, “The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics”, 
Security Policy Brief, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, no.75, 
June 2016, p. 2.
3 N. Tocci, “The Making of  the EU Global Strategy”, Contemporary Security Policy, 
vol. 37, no. 3, 2016, pp. 461-472.
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challenges it faces in adopting an overarching approach to the 
EU’s sometimes conflicting internal agenda:   
“Global” is not just intended in a geographical sense: it also 
refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the Strategy 
promotes. It focuses on military capabilities and anti-terrorism 
as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human 
rights. It deals with peace-building and the resilience of States 
and societies, in and around Europe. The European Union has 
always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing 
so, because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that 
Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to 
an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently 
deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thou-
sands of men and women serving under the European flag for 
peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For 
Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand4. 
Critics point out that it is one of several EU documents that 
aim to strike an internal balance while lacking substantial pol-
icy orientation. But, as Biscop suggests, “it is the strategy now. 
Therefore the question is not what it could have said that it 
doesn’t, but whether it gives us something to work with to ren-
der EU foreign and security policy more effective”. As Biscop 
continues, “the answer is: yes, and quite a lot”5. More than that, 
the foreign and security policy priorities laid out in the EUGS 
encompass a broad range of the EU’s external action. This sends 
a message to the many Euro-sceptical pundits who believe that 
the EU has nothing to show in the foreign policy realm6. 
The EUGS is clear about the priorities of the EU’s external 
action. The core argument is that security starts at home7. This 
4 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, 
p. 4.
5 S. Biscop (2016), p. 1.
6 M.K.D. Cross, “The EU Global Strategy and Diplomacy”, Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, 2016, pp. 402-413.
7 External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: 
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entails that it is imperative for the Union to deal with terrorism, 
hybrid treats, the volatility of global markets, climate change 
and the challenges for energy security. In doing so, the EUGS 
explicitly calls for an appropriate level of strategic autonomy 
as the main foundation upon which the Union can build the 
conditions to foster peace and promote security. Therefore, the 
Union needs to invest in collective security by strengthening 
its links with its partners, especially NATO. At the same time, 
the EUGS argues that the Union’s enlargement policy is neces-
sary for the Union to grow, whereas a more concrete approach 
should be followed to address migration and consolidate re-
gional resilience8. The EU can pursue the peaceful settlement 
of international and regional disputes by promoting political 
and socio-economic stabilisation in unstable regions such as 
the Middle East, Libya, Syria, Africa and the Mediterranean9. 
Overall, the above-mentioned goals and perspectives can be ac-
complished via a multilateral approach to global governance. As 
the EUGS characteristically points out: “Without global norms 
and the means to enforce them, peace and security, prosperity 
and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk”10. 
The Concept of Strategic Autonomy:  
What Does It Mean and Why Does It Matter?
“Strategic autonomy” seems to have emerged as the “holy grail” 
of the EU’s approach to world affairs. In the scholarly liter-
ature – but also among European leaders, policy-makers and 
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, EUGS, 
2016, p. 9.
8 W. Wagner and R. Anholt, “Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s New 
Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic or Promising?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 
vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 414-430. 
9 M. Smith, “Implementing the Global Strategy where it Matters Most: The EU’s 
Credibility Deficit and the European Neighbourhood”, Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 2016, pp. 446-460. 
10 EUGS (2016), p. 39.    
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practitioners – the term originated as a reaction to tectonic 
shifts in the US approach to Europe and their repercussions 
on defence and security. Likewise, as evidenced in numerous 
declarations and documents, the quest for EU autonomy has 
recently paved the way for a better understanding of the EU’s 
self-perception in foreign affairs and, more importantly, what 
the EU wants to achieve beyond its borders11. As Mogherini 
bluntly puts it in her foreword in the EUGS text: “The Strategy 
nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European 
Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of 
our citizens, as well as our principles and values”12. 
However, there is considerable confusion regarding the scope 
of this term: sometimes, as Fiott explicitly says, it goes beyond 
security and defence and “calls for greater ‘European sovereign-
ty’ apply to economic and foreign policy, too”13. Most of the 
time, however the concept is more narrowly applied to EU de-
fence and security policy goals, and is explicitly associated with 
the development of an autonomous European defence industry. 
As stated in the EUGS: “a sustainable, innovative and competi-
tive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic 
autonomy and for a credible CSDP”14. Barbara Lippert, Nicolai 
von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes provide a broader and more 
normative definition of strategic autonomy “as the ability to set 
one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in matters 
of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, 
political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in 
cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone”15. 
11 D. Fiott, Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?, Policy Brief, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018.
12 EUGS (2016), p. 4. 
13 D. Fiott (2018), p. 2.  
14 EUGS (2016), p. 46.
15 B. Lippert, N. Von Ondarza, and V. Perthes, (eds.), European Strategic Autonomy: 
Actors, Issues, Conflicts of  Interests, SWP Research Paper 4, March 2019, Berlin, 
2019, p. 6.
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There are three main constraints on the EU’s ability to con-
ceptualise, formulate and orchestrate a coherent strategy on 
autonomy: a) deficiencies in the overall strategy of the EU re-
garding foreign, defence and security policies; b) the diverging 
national interests of the EU Member States and c) the absence 
of ‘true’ EU capabilities to complement or replace the waning 
appetite of the United States to continue to ensure Europe’s 
security through NATO16. It is evident that despite the key 
institutional developments since the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and CSDP 
continues to be the rule rather than the exception. This has 
hindered the adoption of a single European foreign and secu-
rity policy, which has in turn constrained the development of 
strategic autonomy. Additionally, the diverging nature of the 
national interests of EU Member States reinforces a political 
context in which a truly strategic autonomy cannot emerge17. 
For many observers, the most important constraint on the EU’s 
ability to create the conditions for strategic autonomy is its con-
tinuing dependence on the US, although several EU Member 
States would disagree. Initiatives such as the establishment of 
the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 
2017 and Macron’s European Intervention Initiative in June 
2018 point to stronger cooperation in the defence field in 
Europe. But they also belie a high degree of fragmentation in 
EU security and defence policy18. One can conclude that “the 
EU is not yet able to move towards a higher level of autonomy 
in security and defence, but the Union is displaying greater re-
sponsibility for its security and defence and it is hedging against 
strategic uncertainties”19.
16 A. Billon-Galland and A. Thomson, European Strategic Autonomy: Stop Talking, 
Start Planning, European Defence Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, 
May 2018.
17 F. Tassinari and S. Tetzlaff,  European Security post-Merkel: Denmark should urge 
Franco-German Coordination on EU Defence, DIIS Policy Brief, November 2018.
18 B.O. Knutsen, “European Defence Research in Crisis? The Way Towards 
Strategic Autonomy”, Global Affairs, vol. 2, no. 3, 2016, pp. 287-295.
19 D. Fiott (2018), p. 1.
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Dealing with the Major Partners: 
The EU Response in World Affairs
The objectives set out in the EUGS can be translated into spe-
cific actions for the EU to accomplish in world affairs. Below, 
we examine and assess the relations and strategic priorities of 
the EU with its major partners in the global political arena. We 
begin our analysis with the EU’s most important partner, the 
US, and continue with Russia, Turkey, China and the Western 
Balkans. 
EU-NATO relations and the transatlantic enigma 
Despite recent misgivings, strong cooperation with the US with-
in the NATO framework is a crucial goal for the EU20. As the 
EUGS stresses, the EU will invest in a solid transatlantic partner-
ship in order to reinforce resilience and address conflicts as part of 
its broader goal to promote and consolidate global governance21. 
The EUGS builds upon this and highlights the need for the de-
velopment of a European strategic autonomy within the context 
of EU-NATO cooperation. As the EUGS’ authors characteris-
tically write, “in this context, the EU needs to be strengthened 
as a security community: European security and defence efforts 
should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contribut-
ing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A 
more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a 
healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States”22.  
For the EU, undoubtedly, the US remains the most signif-
icant partner not only in the sphere of security and defence, 
but also for its broader economic and political implications. 
Notwithstanding the rocky state of relations under the current 
20 S. Biscop, (2016b) “All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence 
Policy After the Brexit”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 431-445. S. 
Biscop, “All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy After the 
Brexit”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, 2016b, pp. 431-445.
21 EUGS (2016), pp. 36 and 37. EUGS (2016), pp. 36 and 37.
22 Ibid., p. 20.
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US administration, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) explicitly defines the EU-US partnership as construct-
ed on a solid foundation of common values, including the rule 
of law, democracy, respect for human rights and alleviation of 
global poverty23. The two partners account for more than 50% 
of the global GDP and their economic interdependence is sig-
nificant, with bilateral relations comprising the largest trade 
volume in the world. Both partners contribute close to 80% of 
global development assistance24. 
In the security and defence realm, the EU-US bond is in-
creasingly defined in narrow, interest-based terms. When shared 
interests are at stake, both entities are supportive of each other 
or at least work closely to solve global challenges. However, in 
the last two decades, there is evidence of growing divergence 
regarding transatlantic security mutual understanding and joint 
actions25, coupled with a gradual US disengagement from the 
European theatre. 
The complexity of EU-US cooperation in security and 
defence impacts the perspectives of the development of a 
European strategic autonomy. Whether within EU Member 
States or in international fora, the debate about strategic au-
tonomy “has come in response to recent US criticism of the 
EU”26. Consequently, it typically turns reactive: on the impact 
of strategic autonomy on the transatlantic relationship and on 
the need for differentiation from the US27, rather than on the 
necessity for an autonomous European actor in defence and se-
curity28. How far Europe can go without the US and especially 
23 European External Action Service, The United States and the EU, 6 September 
2017.
24 Ibid. 
25 M. Smith, “Transatlantic Security Relations since the European Security 
Strategy: What Role for the EU in its Pursuit of  Strategic Autonomy?”, Journal of  
European Integration, vol. 40, no. 5, 2018, pp. 605-620.
26 U. Franke and T. Varma, Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit of  Strategic Autonomy, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018, p. 3.
27 A. Billon-Galland and A. Thomson (2018).
28 U. Franke and T. Varma (2018), p. 3.
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the binding context of NATO becomes a matter of its willing-
ness to be prepared for some controversy and political disputes 
with the US29. 
Plainly, President Trump has sent mixed signals concerning 
the development of a European strategic autonomy. On the one 
hand, he sticks to an ‘America first’ doctrine conducted inde-
pendently of international partners, while delivering withering 
criticism of the unwillingness of European NATO members to 
increase defence spending to the agreed-upon benchmark of 
2% of GDP. In such a context, an autonomous EU in the field 
of security could find room for development without the re-
strictive commitments of the NATO framework. On the other 
hand, the US defence establishment remains sceptical of pro-
viding the conditions to allow Europe to become an autono-
mous security power given the US interests that are at stake in 
Europe, such as US access to European bases30. 
In a strategic environment where the US is no longer will-
ing or able to play the role of global hegemon, the rise of the 
EU would mark a momentous change both for the future of 
the EU as a global security actor and the strengthening of the 
transatlantic cooperation31. Yet, at present, its record both in 
terms of normative legitimacy and actual achievements remains 
mixed. Undoubtedly, “Europe needs strategic autonomy in the 
policy area of defence. This sort of autonomy is crucial because 
it opens the door to the creation of an autonomous EU defence 
industry. But, this is not apparently an easy task due to the close 
dependence of European defence key technologies on the US. 
The solution is more cooperation at the EU level, but always 
with a balance with the US”32. 
29 B. Lippert, N. Von Ondarza, and V. Perthes (2019).
30 Ibid.
31 J. Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: Threat or 
Opportunity for Transatlantic Defence Relations?”, Journal of  European Integration, 
vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 523-537.
32 I. Galariotis, The Role of  National Parliaments in EU Defence Cooperation, Policy 
Brief, School of  Transnational Governance, European University Institute, Issue 
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The EU-Russia relations
The EU-Russian relations have been in flux over the past dec-
ade. Traditionally, the EU has regarded Russia as a geopolitical 
rival with a revisionist approach aimed at fundamentally alter-
ing the status quo in the wider region of Eurasia33. Russia had 
an alternative geopolitical project in the common periphery 
throughout the 2000s, when it refused to join the European 
Neighbourhood Policy project. In addition, the Strategic 
Partnership with the EU has been effectively frozen since 2007, 
when the two parties were supposed to but failed to renegoti-
ate a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)34. At the 
same time, though, Russia has always been a ‘strategic partner’ 
within EU political circles. The interdependence of the two en-
tities, sealed by Europe’s gas dependence on Russia, remains 
unchanged. In fact, it is likely to rise in years to come as EU 
demand for gas is expected to grow, and alternative providers 
are nowhere in sight35. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 
marked a turning point that led to a substantial deterioration in 
the relationship between the two entities.
The EUGS stresses the importance of Russia’s compliance 
with international democratic norms as a key strategic challenge 
for the European security order36. As one of the world’s main 
upholders of human rights, the EU is very critical of Moscow’s 
record. As stated in the EUGS document, 
2019/04, June 2019, p. 6.
33 I. Galariotis, Powering Europe. Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze, in Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 68, no. 8, 2016, pp. 1463-1464 (book review).
34 M. Emerson, F. Tassinari, and M. Vahl, A New Agreement between the EU and 
Russia: Why, What and When, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 103, May 2006, Centre for 
European Policy Studies.  
35 R. Kandiyoti, Powering Europe. Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze, New York, 
NY & Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
36 M. Mälksoo, “From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, 
Internal Purpose”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 374-388.  
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[…] peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. 
Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilization 
of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black 
Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its 
core. The EU will stand united in upholding international 
law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s 
right to choose its future freely37. 
In contrast to this critical EU tone, the EUGS recognises that 
the relations between the two entities are strongly interdepend-
ent and that they have to work together in areas where their in-
terests overlap. In March 2016, EU ministers of foreign affairs 
and the High Representative Federica Mogherini agreed on five 
guiding principles for the EU-Russian relations: “full imple-
mentation of the Minsk agreements; closer ties with Russia’s for-
mer Soviet neighbours; strengthening EU resilience to Russian 
threats; selective engagement with Russia on certain issues such 
as counter-terrorism; and support for people-to-people con-
tacts”38. Cooperation should be also strengthened in numer-
ous policy areas including climate change, maritime security, 
education and research, and cross-border assistance. In the last 
three years, the EU has done exactly what the EUGS suggests: 
namely, a two-track approach in its Russia policy. Therefore, 
on the one hand, it has imposed several restrictive measures on 
Russia due to its violations of international law (mainly for the 
case of the annexation of Crimea). On the other, the EU has 
figured out how to further develop its political and economic 
bonds with Russia through the consolidation of the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in crucial areas such as en-
ergy, education, science and technology, justice and freedom, 
and trade. In addition, the EU has worked very closely the last 
three years to enhance its multidimensional approach to resil-
ience in Ukraine. This has been mainly accomplished through 
major financial support to Ukraine to consolidate a robust 
37 EUGS (2016), p. 33.
38 M. Russell, The EU’s Russia policy: Five guiding principles, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, European Parliament, PE 614.698, February 2018, p. 1.
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reform process, including fighting corruption, developing the 
public administration sector and the judiciary, and strengthen-
ing civil society39. 
When it comes to its strategic autonomy, the EU is interest-
ed in reinforcing its relations with the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership. Moscow sees these developments more as threats 
to its own aspirations of regional hegemony than as a frame-
work of cooperation between it and the EU. In this respect, in 
a zero-sum logic, the fractures that appeared in the transatlantic 
relationship after President Trump took office are being seen as 
an opportunity for Russia to shape a multipolar world order 
based on the influence of major powers (such as China, Russia 
and the US, and the EU as well). Additionally, Russia is more 
interested in collaborating with individual EU Member States 
than with the Union as a whole; therefore, the consolidation 
of EU strategic autonomy has importance for Russia only in 
the sense of detaching the EU from the US40. For the EU, the 
enhancement of European strategic autonomy as an antidote 
to Russia’s assertive policy will only come if EU Member States 
effectively work together towards the development of an inde-
pendent EU defence policy. Yet, this would be a difficult task 
because profound differences among EU Member States on 
how to deal with Russia will persist.   
The EU-Turkish Conundrum 
Turkey’s longstanding hopes for EU accession have faded over 
the last decade, especially after the advent of the economic crisis 
in Europe. Turkey is no longer attracted to a Union experienc-
ing deep socio-political and economic crises. At the same time, 
Europe does not want a new member state that may create more 
problems than it solves. One would argue that Turkey’s prospects 
for EU accession were always questionable given substantial 
39 European External Action Service, The European Union’s Global Strategy: 
Three Years On, Looking Forward, EUGS, 2019.
40 B. Lippert, N. Von Ondarza, and V. Perthes (2019).
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concerns from several powerful EU Member States, such as 
Germany and France, regarding Turkish integration in the EU 
family of states. The fraught relationship between the EU and 
Turkey has been significantly complicated by the 2015 migration 
crisis and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s aspiration to trans-
form Turkey into a regional power in the wider Eurasian region.
The EUGS does not mince words when it comes the EU’s 
Turkey policy. The basic proposition is that under the frame-
work of the current EU enlargement policy, the EU seeks to sta-
bilise and consolidate the resilience of the Turkish economy and 
society. This could be achieved through a strict conditionality 
approach that aims to reform and transform the internal politi-
cal landscape in Turkey based on the rule of law and the norms 
of democratisation. In addition, the strategic challenge for the 
EU is to promote economic convergence and good neighbourly 
relations with Turkey, together with cooperation in sectors such 
as migration, energy security, terrorism, and organised crime41. 
Three years after the presentation of the EUGS, the EU 
positively evaluates its existing cooperation with Turkey. The 
EU evaluation of the EUGS states: “The EU has successful-
ly cooperated with Turkey on preserving multilateralism and 
addressing common challenges in areas such as migration, 
counterterrorism, energy, transport, economy and trade”42. It 
continues by stating that considerable improvements have been 
made in the realm of foreign policy between the EU and Turkey 
regarding “issues of common interest, notably Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
the Middle East Peace Process, Libya and the Gulf”43, which is 
quite surprising since Turkey’s EU accession perspectives have 
come to a standstill, as confirmed in the 2019 EU progress re-
port44. At the time of writing, the ongoing Turkish military in-
cursion in the Kurdish-populated areas of Northern Syria has 
further strained the faltering relations. 
41 EUGS (2016), p. 24.  
42 EUGS (2019), p. 18.
43 Ibid.  
44 European Commission, Turkey 2019, Report, Brussels, 29 May 2019.
Europe in Identity Crisis42
Strengthening European strategic autonomy will create fun-
damental challenges to Turkey’s aspirations to become a region-
al power with a different geopolitical agenda from that of the 
EU in the common EU-Turkish neighbourhood. Turkey would 
not welcome a strong EU that could contain Turkey’s strate-
gy and influence in the wider geographical region of Eurasia. 
Erdogan’s anti-Western sentiments are clear evidence on this. 
However, one would consider that Turkey’s case is considera-
bly complex given the national security concerns within Turkey 
regarding the Kurdish question. The challenge for the EU is to 
transform its policy of transactionalism towards Turkey (see, 
for instance, the agreements between the EU and Turkey the 
last two years for the migration crisis) in such a way as to allow 
Turkey to accept and comply with the EU rules-based order45. 
But, this has to be done carefully taking into account the specif-
icities of Turkey’s case and based on the ‘sensitive’ relations be-
tween the two entities, especially in the last decade (see, for in-
stance, Müftüler-Baç’s argument for an External Differentiated 
Integration approach)46. This would help the EU on its path 
towards strategic autonomy, since Turkey would become a co-
operative partner in combating common problems such as im-
migration and terrorism.    
The EU-China partnership 
The relations between the EU and China have grown substan-
tially in recent decades. Although there was very little trade be-
tween the two as recently as twenty years ago, they have now 
established a multi-billion dollar commercial partnership47. 
Diplomatic and political ties between the EU and China have 
45 M. Pierini, Options for the EU-Turkey Relationship, Carnegie Europe, 2019.
46 M. Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey and the European Union: External Differentiated 
Integration or a Transactional Relationship?”, Paper prepared for the EUSA 
Conference, 9-11 May 2019, Denver, Colorado. 
47 J. Howorth, “EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels’ Approach 
to the Emerging Powers”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, 2016, pp. 
389-401.  
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also strengthened significantly. There are summits taking place 
on an annual basis, regular ministerial meetings and an exten-
sive sectoral dialogue aiming to strengthen the bond between 
the two entities48. 
At the same time, the EU acknowledges the challenges that 
arise from China’s penetration in numerous international eco-
nomic spheres (as evidenced by the lengthy debate within the 
EU regarding the diffusion of Chinese 5G equipment in vari-
ous EU Member States)49 and the difficulties that are evident 
within the EU Member States in welcoming a model that is 
based on principles that contrast with the EU one (consider, 
for instance, the “cautiousness” with which the EU faces the re-
ception of the memoranda of understanding under the Belt and 
Road Initiative as well as the 17+1 framework between China 
and several Central and Eastern European Countries). For this 
reason, the EU attempts to arrive at “a flexible and pragmatic 
whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of inter-
ests and values” considering China as a strategic competitor50. 
The EUGS is purely strategic when it comes to the EU po-
sition towards China by highlighting the need to create coher-
ent trade and investment ties, “seeking a level playing field, 
appropriate intellectual property rights protection, greater co-
operation on high-end technology, and dialogue on economic 
reform, human rights and climate action”51. More than that, 
the EUGS asks for the deepening of the EU’s economic diplo-
macy in the wider region of Asia, “working towards ambitious 
free trade agreements with strategic partners such as Japan and 
India, as well as ASEAN member states, with the goal of an 
eventual EU-ASEAN agreement”52. Considering the latter, it 
48 European External Action Service, EU-China Relations Factsheet, Brussels, 
18 October 2019.
49 G. Grieger, 5G in the EU and Chinese telecoms suppliers, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, European Parliament, PE 637.912, April 2019. 
50 European Commission, EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, 12 March 2019, p. 1. 
51 EUGS (2016), pp. 37 and 38.
52 EUGS (2016), p. 38.
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is fair to point out that the EU’s pivotal engagement in the re-
gion of Asia would create an atmosphere of severe antagonism 
between the EU and China challenging the EU’s attempts to 
cooperate with China53.   
Three years after the announcement of the EUGS, we have 
seen the EU enhance its partnerships in Asia and reach trade 
agreements with Japan, Vietnam and Singapore. At the same 
time, and despite the aforementioned concerns, the compre-
hensive strategic partnership with China has been updated to 
reflect the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. 
This does not come as a surprise, since the EU considers China 
a source of economic growth and an important market for 
Europeans who want to invest in China and Chinese businesses 
seeking to transfer capital to Europe54. However, one should 
not disregard the implications of the US-China trade war on 
how the EU will attempt to defend the norms and principles of 
the liberal international order and, consequently, how the EU 
will formulate a strategy concerning EU-Chinese relations in 
the years to come. Apparently, the impact of the trade war be-
tween the US and China has already hit the EU since the global 
growth prospects have been diminished with an effect on fragile 
economies such as the ones in the EU55. It remains to be seen 
whether the EU will keep a cautious yet constructive approach 
towards China or will become more critical putting in danger 
the collaboration between the two entities56.   
China would like to see the EU become an autonomous ac-
tor in global politics across the board, and in this respect it 
53 X. Chen, The EU’s “Pivot to Asia” Will Increase Competition with Beijing”, ISPI 
Commentary, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 27 
September 2019.
54 EUGS (2019).
55 R. Basedow, “The US-China trade war: Risks and opportunities for the EU and 
the United Kingdom”, LSE EUROPP Blog, 2019.
56 N. Casarini, US-China Trade War: Why the EU Should Take Sides and Favour the 
Rules-Based Order, IAI Commentaries,  Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 19/47, 
July 2019.  
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would welcome any EU progress towards strategic autonomy57. 
Obviously, this would be convenient for China only if there are 
no negative repercussions for it. The appointment by China of 
a special envoy for the first time in the history of EU-China 
diplomatic relations is a strong sign that China would like to 
follow a more engaged and ‘strategy-driven’ approach towards 
the EU. For such an approach to succeed, the EU should ex-
pand its China policy beyond the merely economic sphere, and 
pursue a foreign policy strategy that assumes that China can be 
important partner and contributor to global security and peace 
in unstable regions.
The EU and the Western Balkans’ European 
perspective
The strategic priorities of the EU towards the Western Balkans 
focus on a “credible accession process grounded in strict and 
fair conditionality” in order to reinforce the resilience of the 
region’s countries58. The EU’s commitment to improving its re-
lations with the countries of the Western Balkans and to con-
tinue working with them until they join the EU family was 
fully re-affirmed in the 2018 European Commission’s “Strategy 
for the Western Balkans”59. However, the recent veto from a 
few EU Member States on the EU accession perspective of 
North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019 created a neg-
ative ‘”throwback” in the wider strategy of the EU towards the 
Western Balkans. One possible implication would be the end 
of North Macedonia’s pro-EU government. Another risk is that 
the Serbia-Kosovo peace process could take a dangerous turn60. 
Seen in this light, the EUGS is too complacent in assessing 
the future of the relations between the EU and the Western 
57 B. Lippert, N. Von Ondarza, and V. Perthes (2019).
58 EUGS (2016), p. 9.
59 European Commission, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced 
EU engagement with the Western Balkans, Brussels, 6 February 2018.
60 A. Rettman and E. Zalan, “Macron warned on danger of  Balkans veto”, 
EUObserver, 17 October 2019.
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Balkans. The EU considers the geographical region of the 
Western Balkans as “an integral part of the EU’s own regional 
space” and this is fundamental for the European accession per-
spectives of all regional counties61. For instance, key examples 
of the current developments in the region concern 
the historic Prespa Agreement between Greece and North 
Macedonia, the ambitious reform agendas such as the unprec-
edented judicial reform in Albania, the increased cooperation 
through resilience-building measures on security and coun-
ter-radicalization, and the regional roaming agreement signed 
by all Western Balkans governments62. 
The development of EU strategic autonomy would be a game 
changer in the consolidation of the European perspective of 
the countries of the Western Balkans. One key reason is that 
these countries could rely on the EU to face security challenges 
typically originating from the East. In this respect, these coun-
tries are now more than ever in favour of the evolution of the 
EU as coherent security actor in Europe’s close neighbourhood. 
The key premise for this to take place is that the EU resolves its 
continuing ambiguity over enlargement, which at present fun-
damentally undermines the credibility of its position. Despite 
internal political constraints within most EU Member States, 
the EU should not follow buy into the “enlargement fatigue” 
hypothesis, but instead offer official membership to the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans. This would be a crucial step to-
wards the consolidation of EU strategic autonomy, encompass-
ing the geographic region of the Western Balkans in its sphere 
of influence.
  
61 EUGS (2019), p.17.
62 Ibid.
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The Italian Position, at Home and Abroad
While a comprehensive review of Italy’s foreign and security 
policy is beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is evident 
that each of the policy and geographical areas discussed here 
have repercussions and consequences on Italy’s own standing 
and positions. This is on account of both domestic and external 
factors. At home, Italy has displayed and in some cases antic-
ipated some of the same disruptive trends witnessed in other 
European and Western countries: slow growth, rising Euro-
scepticism and anti-migrant sentiments across the political 
spectrum, as well as the mainstreaming of so-called populist 
forces, which have inevitably had a knock-on effect on foreign 
policy views in the country.
Abroad, the bedrock of Italian foreign policy, which has tradi-
tionally rested on pro-EU and Atlanticist pillars, has been shak-
en to its core in light of ongoing European introspection and 
of the absence of a reliable partner in the US. On the European 
front, and notwithstanding Rome’s substantial contribution to 
the conceptualisation of the EUGS, Italy has assumed a more 
critical posture on a variety of European dossiers. The need for 
EU “reform” has become the code word for questioning key 
positions, from Eurozone governance to migration policy. On 
transatlantic relations, Italy remains a trustworthy partner of 
the US, mitigated by a traditionally deferent position towards 
Russia. It has also been explicitly open to China’s advances in 
Europe, first and foremost in relation to Beijing’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
In this context, the ongoing discussion on strategic auton-
omy assumes particularly interesting connotations. Italy has 
consistently been a strong supporter of the need to develop 
European defence capabilities and interests. It has strongly sup-
ported the development of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
as well as parallel initiatives, such as the French-led European 
Intervention Initiative, which Rome officially joined in 
September 2019 with a view to strengthen interoperability and 
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strategic “anticipation”. As such, the more disruptive under-
pinnings of “strategic autonomy”, particularly as seen in the 
French interpretation of the concept and as regards the dimin-
ished role of NATO in European security, displays “Gaulliste” 
instincts that are likely to be unpalatable for Rome. This is not 
only for the thinly-veiled anti-American implications of the 
concept, but perhaps also in view of the recent spats between 
Rome and Paris as regards other key dossiers from industrial 
policy to migration and to the support key Italian figures have 
given to the gilets jaunes movement. Yet, Italy has displayed re-
markable dynamism in developing what effectively amounts to 
a “multi-vector” approach to strategic partnerships. Moreover, 
while the constraints illustrated in this chapter limit Italy’s 
room for manoeuvre, Rome is right to focus on developments 
in its geopolitical sphere of influence, as demonstrated by its 
continuing engagement in Libya and by its recent overtures to 
the North Macedonian government in the wake of the EU ac-
cession rejection.
In recent months, foreign policy headlines in Italy have un-
derstandably concentrated on problematic cases such as Russia 
and its presumed meddling with individual Italian parties and 
policy makers, yet it is striking how much, Italian foreign policy 
is characterised by continuity rather than change, especially in 
light of the momentous changes of the previous years at home 
and abroad. Ongoing domestic instability means that Rome is 
unlikely to take the lead in most of the dossiers described in 
this paper, let alone develop a grand strategy for them. Yet it 
displays a remarkable resilience of the underlying values and 
interests guiding European foreign policy.   
Conclusions: Towards an Enhanced 
EU Strategic Autonomy?
The above analysis provides encouraging signs that the EU, 
three years after the announcement of the EUGS, has man-
aged to reach some of its objectives regarding its relations with 
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several partners in different policy areas. This is remarkable, 
since the relations of the EU with its major partners, i.e. the 
US, Russia, Turkey, China and the countries from the Western 
Balkans, were not an ideal starting point. 
Yet, one aspect that is considerably difficult to ascertain is 
how far Europe can go in developing a broader strategic auton-
omy framework that can help the Union to act as a coherent 
and efficient actor in world affairs. The underlying question is 
whether the EU Member States, despite their internal divisions 
in several policy areas, are willing to formulate and forge a tru-
ly joint strategic culture for the Union as a whole. The way 
forward towards an enhanced EU strategic autonomy should 
have the following characteristics with regard to the EU’s main 
partners:  
• In a narrow sense, the EU should follow an independ-
ent path in the realm of defence policy detached from 
the US. This strategy would reinforce its goal towards 
the development of a strategic autonomy for the Union 
and will stabilize the EU’s relations with relevant part-
ners such as Russia and Turkey.
• Less fragmentation or a more coordinated approach of 
Europe’s often polyphonic positions is a necessary con-
dition for numerous policy areas, so that the EU speaks 
with one voice and acts with one body in world affairs. 
This was admirably displayed in the October 2019 of-
ficial visit of President Macron to China, where he was 
accompanied by German business leaders, a German 
minister and other EU officials. 
Which leads to:
• The approach of the EU to China should go beyond a 
deterministic economic framework. China is a power-
ful player in world affairs and the EU needs to establish 
a broader cooperative scheme with China in the foreign 
policy realm in order to jointly face common security 
problems and consolidate multilateralism globally. 
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• Turkey should be seen as a major partner that could 
still reorient itself towards the Union through mutual 
efforts to take on international challenges ranging from 
migration to organized terrorism, climate change and 
human rights’ violations. A similar strategy could be 
articulated for Russia, despite the long-lasting fraught 
relationship between the two entities. 
• The enlargement strategy of the EU should continue 
being the major transformative process towards democ-
ratisation and stabilisation in the countries of the 
Western Balkans. The countries of the Western Balkans 
should be given an unequivocal signal from Brussels, 
even as some EU Member States would like to revise its 
enlargement policy. 
